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successful production of theatrical programs.6 9 The Court simply re-
fused to go farther than to confirm the fact that a public forum may not
be run as if it were a privately owned facility, leaving it up to the
municipalities to develop the" 'narrow, objective, and definite standards
to guide the licensing authority' 70 required by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Southeastern Promotions are to be derived from the public forum under-
pinnings of its holding. That the Court never reached the substantive
obscenity questions raised in the lower courts should put those accounta-
ble for the management of municipal facilities on notice that they must
apprise themselves of the potential public forum- ramifications that
might well attend their actions. And since the Court refused to lay
down specific guidelines, the burden of devising sufficiently narrow
standards to govern the managing authority in its function was defaulted
to the states. Furthermore, lower courts are charged with the responsi-
bility of exploring the public forum consequences of governmental action
that would frustrate the exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, the
Court recognized that "[t]o permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,"' '
those forums appropriately public must be kept open to constitutionally
protected expression.
JAMES M. PHILLIPS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Standing to Sue in Exdusionary Zoning
Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited
Catch-22, Yosarian observed, involved a simple test with condi-
tions defined so that it was impossible to meet them.1 In an opinion
69. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345, 351 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
70. 420 U.S. at 553, quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969).
71. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
1. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 47 (1955).
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superficially praiseworthy for its simplification of the test for standing in
federal courts, the United States Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin2
followed Heller's cue. The Court in Warth so defined the terms of this
procedural test that most persons ohallenging a zoning ordinance on
grounds of unlawful economic exclusion will never get into federal
court. The practical result forces low and nioderate income persons
first to obtain suburban housing before they can challenge a zoning
ordinance that effectively precludes their acquiring it.
Warth involved the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York, an
incorporated suburb of Rochester. The ordinance allocated ninety-
eight percent 3 of the town's vacant land to single-family detached hous-
ing, with less than one percent4 reserved for multi-family structures
(apartments and townhouses).5 Further ordinance requirements relat-
ing to lot size, floor area, and density of persons per acre combined
effectively to price low and moderate income persons out of the Penfield
housing market. 6
Several groups of plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's zoning ordi-
nance, on its face and as applied, excluded low and moderate income
persons from living in Penfield, in violation of their constitutional rights.
A number of persons who had unsuccessfully sought to find housing in
Penfield alleged that the ordinance forced them to reside in less attrac-
tive and rewarding environments, which additionally resulted in higher
commuting expenses. They argued that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it violated their right to economic equal protection. A
2. 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
3. The opinion of the court of appeals, 495 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974), gives
this figure as ninety percent. There is no indication whether the difference is real or
typographical, and if the latter, which figure is correct.
4. The Court indicated that only .3% of the land allocated for residential use
(ninety-eight percent of available land) was zoned for multi-family housing. 95 S. Ct.
at 2203.
5. The ordinance had been in effect for ten years at the time of suit. See id. at
2203.
6. The Court found that only two projects for low or moderate cost housing had
been proposed in the ten years the Penfield ordinance was in effect prior to suit. One
had failed to secure the requisite approvals from the town government three years prior
to suit. The other was pending at the time of suit. Both of these projects anticipated use
of rent subsidization. Low or moderate cost housing allegedly was unavailable in
Penfield without subsidization. Seeid. at 2208 n.15.
7. The essence of these plaintiffs' claim was a violation of equal protection based
upon economic exclusion. The record indicates that at least some of these plaintiffs
were members of racial or ethnic minorities, and hence could have brought suit on
grounds of racial exclusion. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970). However, plaintiffs'
attorneys, in briefs to the court of appeals, specifically sought standing only on economic
450 [Vol. 54
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group of Rochester taxpayers alleged that Penfield's failure to provide
for its fair share of the region's total housing needs resulted in Rochester
taxpayers having to subsidize a disproportionate share of these needs.8
A civic group concerned with housing sued on behalf of its members
who lived in Penfield, arguing that they had been deprived of the
benefits of living in an economically mixed community.9 In addition,
two associations, one of developers and one of builders, claimed mone-
tary damages for deprivation of profits they would have made in con-
structing low and moderate cost housing had it not been for the exclu-
sionary effect of the zoning ordinance. In sum, these plaintiffs sought
(1) to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional, (2) to enjoin the
town from enforcing the existing ordinance and to require it to develop
a new one correcting past inequities, and (3) monetary damages.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 10 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision, reaching only the standing question.11  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision.
The Court held that none of the plaintiffs had demonstrated a
personal injury, stating that,
the fact that these petitioners share attributes common to persons
who may have been excluded from residence in the town is an
insufficient predicate for the conclusion that petitioners -them-
selves have been excluded, or that respondents' assertedly illegal
actions have violated their rights.
12
Although the Court declined to say exactly what would satisfy the
requirement of personal injury, it did indicate that some demonstrable
interest in a particular project, in which plaintiffs intended to reside,
would suffice to provide standing.13  Plaintiffs here lacked such an
grounds. Accordingly, the Court distinguished Warth from racial exclusion cases which
could have been used to establish standing. See note 14 infra.
8. Note that this is the same ground accepted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the recent, perhaps landmark, case of NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.L 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3053 (U.S. July 8, 1975) (No. 38). See
note 39 infra for a discussion of this case.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 2212 & n.21. Here, too, petitioners' claims were based on eco-
nomic, not racial grounds, despite precedent on point that could have established standing
on racial grounds. See note 14 infra.
10. The Court also noted that the case should not proceed as a class action. Given
that the plaintiffs claiming to represent a class lacked a basis for suit, the class action
issue is moot. 95 S. Ct. at 2207.
11. 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
12. 95 S. Ct. at 2207.
13. Id. at2210n.18.
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interest, and accordingly failed to meet the "injury in fact" requirements
for standing. The associations and the Rochester taxpayers were held
to be suing for rights of third parties, and hence were not proper parties
to bring suit. 4
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent bitterly denounced the opinion as
fabricating procedural snares to insure that the substantive questions
raised would not be reached."5 He argued that according to prior
decisions the injuries alleged were sufficient to allow standing,'0 and he
regarded the Court's failure to so hold as "an indefensible hostility to the
claim on the merits.' 7
STANDING TO SUE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The law of standing is predicated upon the Article HI requirement
that disputes in federal courts present a "case" or "controversy" between
the parties.' 8  The Supreme Court historically has construed this to
mean that the plaintiff must be a proper party to bring the action in
question.' 9 In Baker v. Carr,2" the Court defined this requirement by
stating that plaintiffs must allege "a personal stake in the outcome of the
14. Although the Court dealt at length with the grounds for refusing standing to
each group of plaintiffs, its decision in each instance involved lack of an injury in fact.
(1) The Court rejected the Rochester taxpayers' claim involving regional housing needs
(note that this argument was made on equal protection grounds, not under state statute
as in Mt. Laurel). The Court accordingly found assertions of personal injury too
attenuated, and noted that any remaining claim asserted only third parties' rights. Id.
at 2209-11. (2) The civic organization, nine percent of whose members were Penfield
residents, was said to be asserting the rights of third parties. Regarding the Penfield
residents, the Court implied that standing would have been granted had petitioners
alleged racial exclusion under Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (asserting lost benefits of living in a racially mixed community). However, the
Court noted plaintiffs' refusal to plead on this ground and distinguished Trailicante. Id.
at 2212-13. (3) The association of builders asserted no instance where a project had
been precluded by any action of the town relating to the ordinance, and hence had shown
no injury. Id. at 2214. (4) The association of developers asserted only one instance of
such preclusion, which had occurred three years prior to suit. Id. at 2214-15. The
record indicated no evidence to show a live and concrete dispute, and the Court refused
to hear this claim essentially on grounds of mootness. The Court noted that were there
a live dispute, the question of exhausting remedies would then arise. id. at 2214 n.23.
15. Id. at 2216.
16. Id. at 2218.
17. Id. at 2216.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
19. The Court historically has sought to avoid spurious or unnecessary suits. See,
e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). See generally Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450 (1970); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REv. 645 (1973).
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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controversy"21 in order to insure that a favorable decision by the Court
would personally benefit plaintiffs.
Prior to 196.8, the Court's standing test required proof by the
plaintiff of many of the substantive elements of his case.22  This test
involved substantive evaluation of the legal provisions under which the
plaintiff sought relief, demonstration of the extent and nature of injury,
and a showing that the plaintiff fell within the scope of the contested
statute or constitutional guarantee.23 Additionally, the Court developed
closely related, though non-constitutional, discretionary rules relating to
standing. The most important discretionary rule required that plain-
tiffs' claims be based upon their own injuries, thus barring the use of
courts as a political forum to try suits on the behalf of third parties.
24
Beginning in 1968 with Flast v. Cohen25 and continuing through
Warth, the Court revamped the requirements for standing in federal
courts. 6  In cases prior to Flast, the Court treated the concepts of
standing and justiciability almost interchangeably and did not distin-
guish between the plaintiff and the merits of the case he was bringing.
In subsequent cases the Court established specific standing requirements
relating solely to the person bringing suit. Exemplary of this shift was
the 1970 case of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp,27 which established a two-pronged test for standing under
21. Id. at 204. This language was a statement of existing philosophy, and still
reflects the philosophical underpinnings of standing. The changes in the law of standing
have concerned the test for implementing this philosophy.
22. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
23. See Davis, supra note 19; Scott, supra note 19. Such statutory evaluation often
had the effect of insuring standing in cases where the general test used under Article III
left the standing question in doubt. E.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940).
24. E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943). See also United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1953).
For a detailed discussion on standing and the rights of third parties, see Note, 88 HA.v.
L. REv. 423 (1974) (constitutional jus tertii). Note that this is the converse of the
requirement that a plaintiff must assert a personal injury. See the Court's discussion, 95
S. Ct. at 2205-06.
25. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Although Flast has since been pigeonholed as limited to
taxpayers' suits brought under the first amendment, it broke with prior tests for standing
and initiated the revision of federal standing law.
26. The major cases in this process have been (in order of decision) Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); its companion
case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974); Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Although Data Processing was brought under section 10
of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), the language of the
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Article m11: (1) that plaintiff suffer an "injury in fact," and (2) that
plaintiffs interests fall within the "zone of interests to be regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 12 8  In creating the
"zone of interests" test, the Court sought to maintain a screening
mechanism for invoking its discretionary authority not to hear a case for
policy reasons. 29  The dissent in Data Processing argued that the zone
of interest test concerned reviewability of the subject matter of the case,
not the particular plaintiff bringing suit, and hence was not an appropri-
ate test for determining standing. The dissent further argued that the
Court could exercise its discretionary powers under the rubric of justici-
ability instead of standing. Notably, cases subsequent to Data Process-
ing turned on the question of injury in fact, not zone of interest, and by
1974 a plurality of five of the Justices in United States v. Richardson0
favored abandoning the zone of interest test altogether.3 ' The Court,
however, has been careful to note that while it has markedly reduced the
requirements for standing, it has not abandoned "the requirement that
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury."3' 2 The
rationale for maintaining this requirement reflects the Court's antipathy
toward deciding "political questions"3 and its concern that the remedy
provided be "no broader than required by the precise facts to which the
court's ruling would be applied. '3
4
Two problems in the revision of standing law are noteworthy. First,
although the cases indicate an attempt to standardize the test for stand-
ing in varied factual contexts, the Court has persistently repeated the
warning that generalizations about standing are hazardous.3, Second,
the Court's opinions have been noteworthy in their failure to define
"injury in fact.""0  Given the Court's opinions through Richardson, a
definitional process appeared imminent.
opinion refers to both statutory and constitutional claims. Subsequent decisions have
indicated that the case does apply to nonstatutory suits. See cases cited note 26 supra.
28. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
29. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
30. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
31. The four dissenting Justices and Justice Powell, concurring, were of this
opinion. Id. at 180, 197, 202, 235.
32. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
34. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
35. This has historically been true of the Court's standing decisions, prompting the
comment by Professor Freund that the concept of standing is one of "the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law." In Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
467-68 (1966).




The Supreme Court has heard less than a handful of zoning cases
in the past fifty years.37  Virtually all zoning problems have been
litigated at the state court level. Suits in state court typically challenge a
specific ordinance as failing to comply with the state's zoning enabling
act. Standing requirements, usually requiring that the plaintiff exhibit
some proprietary interest, are generally found within these statutes. In
many states, these requirements have recently been liberalized to include
persons who lack proprietary interests but are nevertheless affected by
the zoning ordinance. 38
State remedies have been sufficient for virtually all zoning contro-
versies except those involving racial discrimination. These controversies
have been brought in federal court, under civil rights legislation, 9 the
Fair Housing Act of 1968,0 and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Federal courts generally have invalidated zon-
1190. The Court has specified only very broad parameters for the "injury in fact" test.
For example, in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the Court indicated that
"[a]bstract injury is not enough." Id. at 494. Similarly, the Court in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), required "some threatened or actual injury resulting
from the putatively illegal action." Id. at 617. No actual definition of "injury in fact"
had been given prior to Warth.
37. The landmark case establishing zoning as a proper exercise of police power was
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). There have been two pure zoning
cases since Euclid. Beery v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927) (which merely followed
Euclid); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding single-family
zoning). See generally N. WILLIAMS, 3 AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE
POLICE POWER (1975) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS].
38. Most statutes require persons suing under them to show a proprietary or
equitable interest in land within the zoned area subject to dispute. However, recent
decisions at the state court level have expanded the basis for suit. Of particular note in
the context of economic exclusion is Mt. Laurel. See note 8 supra. The New Jersey
Supreme Court there held that zoning ordinances which failed to provide for the
municipality's fair share of the regional housing needs are challengeable under the state
zoning enabling act. This conclusion is seen as following from a regionalized conception
of Euclid's public welfare language. See Bums, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclu-
sionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 179 (1975). A number of'
commentators see Mt. Laurel as setting the trend in state courts in economic exclusion-
ary zoning litigation. Bums, supra; Kushner, Land Use Litigation and Low Income
Housing: Mandating Regional Fair Share Plans, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 10 (1975);
Williams, supra note 37. The implications of this development in terms of who can sue
is to stretch the requisite interest for suit to a regional scope, thereby including taxpayers
of other municipalities in the region and other municipalities themselves. For discus-
sions of other trends in exclusionary zoning decisions in the state courts, see generally
Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The Second Generation of Cases
and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 88 (1974); Note, 5 MEMPHIS STATE U.L. REv.
251 (1975).
39. Generally under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970).
40. Id. § 3601 et seq.
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ing provisions which embody racial discrimination.41
Cases involving economic, as opposed to racial, exclusion have
appeared only recently. Some of these suits have been brought in state
courts under state enabling acts.42 Others, based solely on a constitu-
tional right of economic equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment, have been brought in federal court. Inasmuch as these latter suits
are not brought under state statute or under a federal statute,43 both of
which have standing requirements, plaintiffs must comply with the
general requirements for standing under Article III as construed by the
Supreme Court. Determination of these requirements accordingly fixes
the scope of litigation in an economic exclusionary zoning context.44
CATCH-22 REVISITED
The Court in Warth used the context of exclusionary zoning to
further revise the law of standing, much as it had in cases of varied fact
situations since 1968. Recognizing the plurality decision in Richardson,
the Court used a single test, injury in fact, as the determinant of standing
under Article III. "Zone of interests" was not mentioned in the
opinion. One may accordingly draw the conclusion that Warth's signif-
icance in the context of standing litigation is to remove the zone of
interest test established in Data Processing.
Despite this step toward simplification, however, the Court compli-
cated the entire standing issue, and severely restricted the substantive
bases for suit, at least in economic exclusionary zoning litigation,
through the manner in which it defined "injury in fact." The cases
prior to Warth seemed to indicate that almost any showing of monetary
or opportunity losses resulting from the alleged statutory or constitution-
al violation constituted a sufficient "injury" to meet the standing re-
quirement and allow the suit to be heard on the merits.43 Warth, in
contrast, construed the statutory/constitutional violation itself to be the
requisite "injury" that must be shown to establish standing. The Court
stated that alleged monetary and opportunity losses might measure the
extent of harm, but such losses without the showing of the violation of a
41. See 95 S. Ct. at 2209 n.17 for a listing of a number of major cases in this area.
All of these cases involved particular projects and instances of discrimination.
42. See the discussion of the Mt. Laurel case note 39 supra.
43. E.g., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).
44. See WILLIAMS, supra note 37, for a discussion of the courts' treatment of cases
asserting the doctrine of economic equal protection.
45. See 95 S. Ct. at 2218.
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right are not sufficient to warrant suit.46  This is clearly inconsistent
with the Court's prior use of the term injury. For example, in Sierra
Club v. Morton the Court recognized an aesthetic and environmental
interest in land about to be despoiled as sufficient to warrant standing in
a suit alleging a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.4T
Clearly an allegation that one's aesthetic interests have been or are about
to be harmed is a far cry from a claim that one's statutory/constitutional
rights have been violated. Had the Court used the Warth test, it would
have refuted an aesthetical/environmental basis for attaining standing in
Morton. It would also have denied standing in Data Processing, in
which an alleged violation of plaintiff's economic interests was found
sufficient to clear the standing hurdle.
In Warth the Court thus retained the catch-words of its test for
standing under Article rI-injury in fact-but changed what those
words mean. In an exclusionary zoning context, the result is that the
plaintiff must demonstrate a specific instance of exclusion involving a
specific project or parcel of land in order to attain standing.4 Accord-
ingly, by its construction of "injury in fact," the Court requires a
proprietary interest for zoning litigation.49  One may postulate that the
Court decided upon a final result (proprietary interest) and then rede-
fined "injury in fact" as the easiest way of arriving at it. It might be
noted, however, that by raising a proprietary interest to a federal consti-
tutional requirement in zoning litigation, the Court is reverting to the
pre-1968 confusion in standing cases by failing to differentiate between
the person bringing suit and the justiciability of his claim. This seems
to obviate the entire line of standing decisions since 1968-unless future
decisions manage to limit the construction used in Warth to an exclu-
sionary zoning context.50
46. Id. at2207n.13.
47. 405 U.S. at 738.
48. One has to be excluded from something. Saying one has been excluded from
the whole town fails to demonstrate when and how this exclusion occurred. Such
specificity requires an instance of exclusion from a particular project. Mr. Justice
Brennan asserts that the effect of the decision is to require proof on the merits in order
to gain standing. See 95 S. Ct. at 2220.
49. Note that this result is strangely similar to the traditional requirements for
standing under the state enabling acts. See WILLIAMS, supra note 37.
50. It is interesting to note that the Court's construction of injury left the dissent in
the anomalous position of arguing that the interests of at least three of the sets of
plaintiffs (i.e., the individual petitioners, the civic association, and the group of develop-
ers), taken as a whole, justified standing, and that the Court erred in treating "each set
of plaintiffs as if it were prosecuting a separate lawsuit, refusing to recognize that the
interests of any one group must take into account its position vis-a-vis the others." 95 S.
Ct. at 2216. The dissent argued that the manner in which the standing issue was framed
19761 STANDING 457
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In trying to ascertain who can sue and under what circumstances in
the wake of Warth, it becomes apparent that the Court, in the name of
procedure, has severely restricted the substantive claims that will be
heard on the merits to the point of virtually removing economic exclu-
sionary zoning litigation from the federal courts.51 One need merely
look at the possible injuries in fact that would satisfy Warth's standing
test to see the validity of this assertion. (1) Persons living outside the
muncipality may sue on grounds of unlawful exclusion,"2 so long as they
demonstrate an interest in a particular project. However, this means
that they must find a project, which in turn requires a developer willing
to tie up his money in a project that contravenes the zoning for the
amount of time needed -to exhaust administrative remedies before an
intransigent municipal government and then proceed with litigation.
Time costs money in development, and the amount of time involved in
such a situation is likely to make development prohibitive. (2) Those
living within the municipality can challenge the administration of the
ordinance in a particular instance, alleging as their injury the depriva-
tion of the benefits of an economically mixed community.53 But again,
this will require a project and a developer. (3) The developer or his
association can challenge a particular application of the ordinance as
being arbitrary, once administrative remedies are exhausted.54 But
again, there must be a development-presumably planned, financed,
subsidized, and ready for construction except for the zoning problem-
in order for there to be a real injury.
These are the only direct, personal "injuries in fact" that can exist
under Warth. Any plaintiff failing to allege such an instance of exclu-
sion will lack standing to sue. Justice Brennan notes -the absurdity of
this position:
ignored the realities of the case, "that the low-income-minority plaintiff's interest is not
to live in a particular project but to live somewhere in the town in a dwelling they (sic)
can afford." Id. at 2217. However true this may be, the context in which the dissent
moved to get from this argument to the conclusion that standing existed is nothing less
than the "zone of interest" test that these same dissenters favored abolishing in
Richardson. This reasoning ignores the philosophy underlying the recent trend of
standing decisions, and mirrors the majority opinion in attempting to reach a final result
without paying enough attention to how it gets there.
51. See id. at 2216,2221.
52. The bases of suit would be equal protection and possibly the right to travel. See
generally WILLIAMS, supra note 37.
53. This is the Trailicante argument discussed in note 14 supra. It is based on
arbitrariness under due process (fourteenth amendment).
54. Depending upon the project, claims would be based on either equal protection
or due process grounds.
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In effect, the Court tells the low-income-minority and building
company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what they
have alleged-that they could and would build and live in the
town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its appli-
cation-because they have not succeeded in breaching, before the
suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of the suit.55
In Heller's words, "there was only one catch, and that was Catch-22." 5
The Court's restriction of future suits to these three types of fact
situations-all of which require a wealthy developer willing to tie up his
money for a considerable length of time-will have the practical result
of keeping further economic exclusionary zoning litigation out of federal
court. Arguably, this is what the Court intended to do. A decision in
a zoning context based solely on a right of economic equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment would open to challenge on constitu-
tional grounds zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants nation-wide.
This is not to say that the Court has determined that there is no such
right, but merely that the Court has substantially reduced the chances of
hearing such a case. In a zoning context, the result of the restrictive
definition in Warth will be to channel all cases involving zoning back
into state courts. Here plaintiffs can challenge local ordinances under
the state enabling acts and avoid the federal standing test. That this is
-the signficance of Warth is indicated in the first (and so far only) case
to apply it, Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City
of Petaluma,7 in which the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on Warth,
denied standing in an exclusionary zoning context on the ground that
plaintiffs -had not themselves been unlawfully excluded from the city,
and hence were arguing the rights of third parties.58
CONCLUSION
The Court in Warth recognized the plurality position in Richard-
son by adopting a single test for standing in federal courts, but then
proceeded to define that simple test so as to preclude most plaintiffs and
their substantive claims, at least within an exclusionary zoning context.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2217.
56. J. HELLER, supra note 1, at 47.
57. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), noted in 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976).
58. The court of appeals' terminology is confusing, in that the opinion is predicated
on Warth but uses the language "zone of interest." Arguably, this confusion arises from
the court's failure to understand that Warth changes the definition of injury. In any
event, the rationale used by the court is firmly grounded in Warth, even if the language
is not.
1976] STANDING 459
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The dissent's view that the Court treated the substantive area with
hostility seems justified.59 Whether future opinions will attempt to limit
the "injury in fact" construction of Warth to exclusionary zoning cases is
conjectural, though it is likely in light of the trend of cases prior to
Warth and the peculiarly volatile consequences of applying this trend in
a zoning context. The impact of Warth on zoning litigation is not likely
to be severe. State courts are becoming increasingly receptive to prob-
lems of economic exclusion, and arguably every plaintiff that has litigat-
ed this issue in the federal courts to date would have found a more
favorable forum in state court. Warth may have a larger impact in the
area of equal protection, given the constraints it places on bringing cases
in federal court that raise this issue in an economic context.
It might be noted that Warth was the wrong case to appeal if the
goal were to establish an economic equal protection doctrine. There
should have been a history of repeated project denials and plaintiffs who
would have been able to live in the projects had they been built. 0 The
consequences of bringing Warth before the Court are a number of
restrictive precedents in both standing law and the use of the equal
protection doctrine that if followed will have an adverse impact on
creative developments in both these areas. Unfortunately, given the
context of Warth in the series of standing decisions and the restrictions it
imposes on future zoning cases, it is not at all certain that the Court will
reassess its .holding in the near future.
WILLIAM W. DREYFOOS
Constitutional Law-The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine
From 1972 to 1974, the conclusive presumption doctrine' surfaced
as a viable vehicle for Supreme Court invalidation of legislation. The
doctrine requires nearly perfect conformity between the results of the
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2216.
60. See the Court's discussion. Id. at2209 n.16.
1. "Conclusive presumption" will be used interchangeably with "irrebuttable pres-
umption." See Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer
Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 217, 220 (1975), where the internal
inconsistency of the terminology is described.
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